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ANTITRUST
ANTITRUST: PER SE DOCTRINE - TYING
ARRANGEMENTS AND THE MARKET POWER
REQUIREMENT
Shrouded in a veil of semantical confusion, the per se
doctrine requirement continues to plague unwary plaintiffs in
tying arrangement1 suits. The standard, which many thought2
had been effectively consigned to oblivion by Justice Black's
decision in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., appears to still contain some vestige of life as evi-
denced by the recent case of Smith v. Scrivaer-Boogaart.4
In Scrivner-Boogaart the appellant, a wholesaler, alleged
that Scrivner-Boogaart, a wholesale-retail grocer and manu-
facturer, violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Sections
3 and 16 of the Clayton Act by means of a sub-lease agree-
ment" which required appellee's customers to purchase 65
per cent of their total monthly net sales from appellee and
to participate in various services to be rendered by appellee.
Thus, appellant contended that he was foreclosed from a sub-
stantial segment of the tied product market. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sustained the jury's findings
1 "[A] tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement
by a party to sell one product [tying product] but only
on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different
(or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not pur-
chase that product from any other supplier." Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
2 Note, Antitrust - Tying Arrangements - A Re-examination
of the Per Se Rule and Identification of Tying Arrange-
ments, 48 N.C.L. REv. 309 (1970). See Comment, Tying Ar-
rangements: Requisite Economic Power, Promotional Ties
and the Single Product Defense, 11 B.C. InD. & Com. L.
R.v. 306 (1970).
8 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
4 447 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1059
(1972).
5 447 F.2d at 1016 n.1.
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that, due to a lack of sufficient evidence, both of merit and
of quantity, the appellant failed to meet his burden of proof.
This note is concerned solely with what the Tenth Circuit
labelled as appellant's first contention - namely, that the ty-
ing arrangement of the appellee was a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.6
Initially the court remarks that appellant is basing his
first contention on "the rule of Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corporation . . . and cases there cited".7
The court then states that the lower court's instruction to the
jury "was quite sufficient advising in the very language of
Fortner", and the jury "found that the appellant did not meet
the burden of his case under Fortner".8 It is highly apparent
at this juncture that this portion of the case at issue was
argued and decided on the construction given to the Supreme
Court's holding in Fortner. Therefore, an analysis of Fortner
should aid in a determination of what constitutes a per se
violative tying agreement under the Sherman Act.
In Fortner the plaintiff alleged that there was a con-
tinuing agreement between the defendants to force the plain-
tiff and other like-situated persons, as a condition to avail-
ing themselves of the services of the United States Steel
Homes Credit Corporation, to purchase at artifically high
prices only homes manufactured by United States Steel. The
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit had mistakenly
ruled on whether a question of fact as to a possible violation
of the Sherman Act had been raised. The case was remanded
on the issue of a determination of market power. Justice
Black's majority opinion encompasses the standards expound-
6 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). This sec-
tion states: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal ... "
7 447 F.2d at 1016.
8 Id. at 1017.
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ed in each of the three major cases involving per s.e illegal
tying agreements.
The International Salt Co. v. United States9 case, in which
the per se doctrine was first propounded, involved the leasing
of certain patented machines conditioned upon the stipula-
tion that only the lessor's products could be used in the ma-
chines. In ruling upon the illegal restrictive leases, Justice
Jackson, in his statement of the majority's view of the issue
at hand, succinctly enunciated the doctrine that "it is un-
reasonable, per se to forclose competitors from any substan-
tial market."10 The Court concerned itself principally with
the de minimus factor- the foreclosure of competition from
a substantial portion of the tied product market; the Fortner
opinion makes several references to International Salt for
the purpose of examining that factor. However, of even great-
er import in the International Salt opinion is the marked ab-
sence of any mention of economic power in the tying product
market. This has led to various observations" concerning the
necessity or value of the market power requirement in tie-in
cases. Nevertheless, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States,'2 a major tying arrangement case involving the
sale of advertising space in a newspaper, the Court definitive-
ly stated, and ruled on the basis of the economic power stand-
ard, asserting it to be "a monopolistic position in the market
for the 'tying' product". 3
The Fortner majority relied heavily upon the "economic
power" standard discussed in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States. 4 This case involved the lease or sale of certain par-
9 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
10 Id. at 396.
11 For a discussion of the implications of International Salt,
see Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the
Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50 (1958).
12 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
13 Id. at 608.
14 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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cels of land conditioned on the requirement that the lessees
or vendees ship the products of the land on defendant's trains.
Regarding tying arrangements, the Court declared:
They are unreasonable in and of themselves when-
ever a party has sufficient economic power with re-
spect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product and
a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce
is affected. 6
In its analysis of the economic power standard, the Court
did not enter into a quantitative examination of the tying
product market an d defendant's relative positive therein;
rather, it decided that land, being unique and, in this in-
stance, "strategically located", sufficiently satisfied the mar-
ket power standard.
United States v. Loew's Inc.,16 the third prominent case
which the Fortner Court relied on, involved "block booking"
-the licensing or sale of films conditioned upon the accept-
ance of one or more unwanted films. Justice Black, in the
Fortner opinion, quoted with approval from the dictum of
Loew's to the effect that:
'Even absent a showing of market dominance, the cru-
cial economic power may be inferred from the tying
product's desirability to consumers or from unique-
ness in its attributes."'
By a process of evolution the Court has, thus, liberalized
the economic power standard, once requiring "market domi-
nance", but later declaring that a mere inference from the
"desirability" or "uniqueness" of the product is sufficient. It
is readily apparent that the Court persisted in this liberaliz-
ing trend in Fortner as evidenced by the cases cited therein
as precedent: one completely ignoring the market power
15 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
16 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
7 394 U.S. at 504.
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standard,18 the other two allowing simply "desirability" or
"uniqueness" to satisfy the requirement,D and not even the
merest of allusions to the stringent standards set forth in
Times-Picayune.20
It was thought that the Fortner Court, continuing in this
tenor, would naturally proceed to the next rational phase by
the elimination of the market power criterion, declaring that
the very achievement of a tying agreement is adequate proof
of a seller's economic power. Although the Court did come
very close to ruling that a true, rather than a qualified, per
se doctrine applies to tying arrangements, it nevertheless re-
fused to do so, and remanded the case for a determination
of market power. This continued adherence to the standard
has led to much criticism21 of the opinion, but, even more
importantly, has led to a great deal of perplexity.22
The lower courts, left adrift in the sea of confusion, are
apparently bewildered by the decision as manifested by their
varying interpretations of it. In one of the first opinions2 3
to construe Fortner, t h e Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated:
Under Fortner . . . the "sufficient economic
power" test of per ae illegality is satisfied when it ap-
pears that the seller has the power to "impose other
burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect to
Is International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
10 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
20 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594 (1953).
21 Note, Credit as a Tying Product, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 1433
(1969); Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CoRNmELL L. REv. 161
(1969).
22 See Fortas' dissent in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 520 (1969).
23 Advance Business Syss. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415
F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
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any appreciable number of buyers within the mar-ket',.24
In fact, however, the successful imposition of a tie-in was,
in the Fortner opinion, held to be no more than an important
factor to be considered - a "proper focus of concern" 2 - in
the determination of market power. The Supreme Court, con-
trary to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation," did not go to
the extent of stating that an inference of economic power
could be based solely upon the existence of a tying agree-
ment.
The Tenth Circuit, ruling in the Scrivner-Boogaart case,
evidently recognized the above discrepancy and, unlike the
Fourth Circuit, refused to approve a less qualified per se doc-
trine.
The Sixth Circuit, deciding Fortner on remand,27 also de-
cided that the Fourth Circuit had misinterpreted the Supreme
Court's Fortner opinion and stated that:
If the majority had intended to indicate that accept-
ance of a tie-in by an appreciable number of cus-
tomers is sufficient proof of the requisite economic
power, it would have been sufficient for Mr. Justice
Black to have said so and thus to avoid the exhaustive
treatment which he gave to the question of economic
power in the tying product set forth in other por-
tions of his opinion. 28
In addition to its interpretation of the Fortner decision,
undoubtedly another reason as to why the court in Scrivner-
Boogaart refused to uphold appellant's first contention is re-
24 415 F.2d at 68.
25 394 U.S. at 504.
26 In support of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, see Com-
ment, Per Se Illegality of Tying Arrangements Involving
Credit Financing, 50 BOSTON U.L. REV. 125 (1970).
27 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 452
F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1971).
28 Id. at 1103.
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vealed by the fifth section29 of the opinion. Here the court
mentions that there was evidence of a price-fixing agreement
which was neither alleged nor proved by the appellant. Since
price-fixing agreements are subject to a true per se rule, the
court felt no obligation to tread on the quicksand of the per
se tying arrangement doctrine when the case could easily
have been based on firmer ground.
In conclusion, the Scrivner-Boogaart case is not, in itself,
a noteworthy opinion, which is the reason why it has not
been remarked on with any appreciable amount of deference
in this article. Although it would appear inevitable that tying
arrangements will be subject to a true per se doctrine, the
Tenth Circuit, as evidenced by this decision, has no intention
of being in the vanguard of the movement. Rather, in this
evolutionary process of the per se doctrine, the value of the
case is as an interpretive device. Without such cases as Scriv-
ner-Boogaart, one's capacity to comprehend the practical im-
pact, as well as the theoretical import, of the Fortner decision
would be most lamentably diminished.
Aimee Frances Fisher
29 447 F.2d at 1018.
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